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On November 7th, 1917, in the depths of the First World War, the 
Bolshevik party of Russia launched a revolution that ousted the pro-
war democratic government of Alexander Kerensky and replaced it 
with a communist dictatorship. This new government alarmed and 
antagonized Russia’s previous allies Britain, France, and the United 
States almost from the moment of its inception. The Bolsheviks’ 
refusal to acknowledge any of Russia’s debts, alongside their 
government’s hope for immediate peace with Germany, raised 
doubts among the British and French over their chances for victory.1 
For American President Woodrow Wilson, however, it was the 
fall of democracy and the ascendency of communism that seemed 
the most disturbing part of the Revolution. President Wilson believed 
strongly in democracy and self-determination of peoples, and saw 
communist ideology as a suppression of these natural rights.2 As time 
passed and Russia’s absence from the fighting began to weigh heavily 
on British and French war efforts, these powers sought to intervene 
in Russia’s civil war to install a government capable of re-opening the 
eastern front, among other objectives.3 
Despite cold relations with the Bolshevik government, Wilson 
initially declined all proposals for military intervention, believing 
them to be infeasible. As time passed and conditions within Russia 
rapidly changed, however, Wilson began to consider intervention a 
possibility. Though intervention in Russia might be interpreted as a 
departure from Wilson’s principle of self-determination, he did not 
view it as such. American intervention in Russia was designed to 
complement and expand upon earlier peaceful attempts to end the 
Bolshevik movement. Intervention was used to satisfy the Allies’ 
desire for action while simultaneously attempting to achieve Wilson’s 
primary goal of restoring democracy and self-determination to a 
nation he believed had been forced into communism against its will. 
                                                     
1 Carol Melton, Between War and Peace: Woodrow Wilson and the  American  
   Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918-1921 (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2001), 3. 
2 David Foglesong, America’s Secret War against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the  
   Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995),  
   66-67. 
3 Supreme War Council to President Wilson, 2 July 1918, in Betty Unterberger, ed.,  
   American Intervention in the Russian Civil War (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company,  
   1969), 37-38. 
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 Even before the Bolshevik revolution, Wilson had never had 
any qualms about using the military to stabilize a country that 
appeared ready to slide into anarchy. The president had used the 
military to intervene in Mexico in April of 1914 when that nation was 
suffering a disruptive civil war. Many of Wilson’s actions during this 
intervention would mimic his later decisions in Russia.4 His objective 
in Mexico was to restore order and democracy, the same goal he 
would later echo when discussing Russian intervention. 
Prior to direct intervention in Mexico’s civil war, Wilson first 
attempted to find a method of ending Mexico’s troubles that did not 
involve the military. Before deciding to intervene, the president 
considered non-recognition of the new government, arms shipments 
to counter-revolutionary groups, and searching for “strong men to 
restore order” as viable strategies; ultimately these tactics would all be 
employed in both Mexico and in Russia.5 These similarities suggest 
that Wilson’s goals for Russia were in line with his goals for Mexico, 
namely the restoration of order and the establishment of democracy 
in a nation that appeared to the president to be falling to anarchic 
elements. 
 Even with a history of intervention and a personal belief in 
self-determination, committing troops to a distant front during 
wartime would be dangerous at best, something Wilson’s Chief of 
Staff Newton Baker often mentioned to the president.6 Wilson’s 
ideological beliefs were highly important to him, and it was ultimately 
ideological concerns that convinced the president, against the advice 
of his chief of staff, to agree to intervention. These ideological 
concerns took the form of a genuine fear of socialism, particularly its 
potential to incite revolution and its harsh anti-individualist rhetoric. 
Wilson characterized socialism as a disruptive and destructive 
force, claiming that socialist “method is madness,” and that he would 
“reject, as [I] would reject poison itself, the prescriptions of 
Socialism.”7 Wilson feared that Bolshevik ideology would come to 
                                                     
4 Melton, 16. 
5 Foglesong, 17-20. 
6 Melton, 24. 
7 Woodrow Wilson, as quoted in Foglesong, 28. 
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America via immigrants and in many speeches expressed mistrust of 
new American citizens, culminating in a Red Scare directed against 
immigrants in the late 1910s.8 His hatred of socialism would 
eventually lead him to claim in 1919 that “Bolshevism was a greater 
menace than the risk of a reversion to tsarism.”9 
Wilson’s Secretary of State Robert Lansing shared and even 
surpassed Wilson’s mistrust of socialism. He believed radical change 
was indicative of rash decisions and believed socialism could only be 
achieved through strong central government, which would ultimately 
destroy American individualism.10 Lansing’s hatred of socialism made 
him one of the leading figures in the campaign to convince Wilson to 
intervene in Russia. He was the minister who first suggested 
intervention to support the reactionary leader of the White Army, 
General Kaledin, in his attempt to topple the Bolshevik 
government.11 These examples indicate that two of America’s 
highest-ranking policymakers had a strong antipathy to socialism, and 
Wilson’s personal views toward self-determination and democracy 
made him an early enemy of the Bolshevik regime. 
In spite of this willingness to intervene and Wilson’s personal 
antipathy to socialism, when Kerensky’s government fell in the 
Bolshevik Revolution, intervention was not the first thing on 
President Wilson’s mind. Wilson was initially firmly against any type 
of intervention in Russia, although he was sympathetic to the turmoil 
the country was experiencing. Wilson originally believed, prudently, 
that intervention in Russia would either be misconstrued or 
propagandized as a hostile or imperialist action and that it might 
ultimately turn liberal Russians away from their democratic 
principles. 
This view was stressed to the Japanese government, one of the 
most ardent supporters of intervention, in a diplomatic note of 
March 5, 1918.12 When Secretary of State Lansing forwarded requests 
for Siberian intervention from other Allies later that same month, 
                                                     
8 Foglesong, 41. 
9 Foglesong, 186. 
10 Foglesong, 30. 
11 Lansing to Wilson on Kaledin Movement, 10 December 1917, in Unterberger, 27-28. 
12 Wilson’s Draft Statement against Intervention, 5 March 1918, in Unterberger, 31. 
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Wilson wrote yet again of his reservations: “I have put to [the British 
ambassador to the United States] Lord Reading and all others who 
argue in favour of intervention… What is it to effect and how will it 
be efficacious in effecting it?”13 
Wilson did not initially believe that sending troops to Russia 
would achieve any purpose beneficial to the Russian people and was 
privately concerned that Japanese interests in Siberia were territorial 
rather than altruistic in nature.14 Wilson was always willing to provide 
support to counter-revolutionary groups, but in the months 
immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution he was unwilling to 
commit to direct military intervention. It would not be until later in 
1918 that new developments would provide Wilson with the 
justification he believed he would need to send American troops to 
Russia. 
This is not to suggest that the Allies passively accepted Wilson’s 
reluctance to intervene, for they did not. For Britain and France, the 
issue of Russian intervention was primarily a military one and was 
viewed as critically important by both governments. With Russia out 
of the war and the Germany free to divert all of its forces to the 
western front, both powers feared the possibility of a rapid defeat. 
According to Carol Melton, “almost immediately after the November 
Revolution… Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Generalissimo of the Allied 
armies, suggested that the allies undertake armed intervention in 
Russia… using it as a means to restore the Eastern Front.”15 While 
this idea was initially dismissed, it gradually gained support with the 
Allies until it became a major point of contention with the 
noncommittal United States. 
What followed was several months of diplomatic prodding from 
virtually all of the Allies in an attempt to persuade Wilson to change 
his mind and approve of, if not participate in, Russian intervention. 
The first formal request came from the British Foreign Office in 
January of 1918, but this was only to be the beginning of a much 
                                                     
13 Lansing to Wilson, 22 March 1918, as appears in Unterberger, 32. 
14 Foglesong, 146-149. 
15 Melton, 3. 
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larger campaign.16 On February 26-27, both the British and French 
sent renewed requests to approve of intervention, and throughout 
the entire month of March Wilson was inundated with requests from 
every member of the Allies, including the Supreme War Council, to 
agree to intervention.17 In spite of the immense diplomatic pressure 
he was under, Wilson was unwilling to approve of any intervention 
that appeared to violate his self-determination principles, and he thus 
vetoed all proposals for direct intervention that he received. The 
Allies were likewise unwilling to accept a total lack of intervention, 
but by the beginning of April it was obvious that Wilson would not 
approve military intervention unless new developments arose, and 
the Allies thus grudgingly let the matter drop. 
Wilson’s initially cool attitude toward military intervention was 
balanced by a more vigorous approval of other forms of intervention, 
partially stemming from a desire to prove to the Allies that in other 
forums the president could be a team player. Wilson’s concerns 
about military intervention did not preclude the possibility of 
supporting counter-revolutionary groups in other ways, and via these 
methods the president set out to prove himself. Barely a month after 
the Bolshevik Revolution, Lansing drafted a proposal to the president 
that recommended the support of General Kaledin and a military 
dictatorship as a better alternative for Russia than Bolshevism.18 
Kaledin and his fellow counter-revolutionaries desperately needed 
money, but without formal diplomatic recognition the United States 
could loan them nothing. 
In spite of this, Wilson considered the support of these counter-
revolutionary groups important enough that he worked out a plan 
with the British and French to circumvent the obstacle. Instead of 
supporting Kaledin directly, America loaned money to the Allies, 
which was then used by those governments to supply the counter-
revolutionary White armies.19 This move is exemplary of Wilson’s  
  
                                                     
16 Melton, 3-4. 
17 Melton, 5-7 and Unterberger, 32. 
18 Secretary Robert Lansing’s Memorandum and Draft Telegram on the Kaledin Movement,  
    December 10, 1917, as appears in Unterberger, 27-28. 
19 Foglesong, 88-90. 
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early strategies for intervention, which were often shrouded in 
secrecy so as to avoid antagonizing any Americans sympathetic to the 
Bolshevik cause and almost universally involved supporting these 
counter-revolutionary groups with American funds. 
In another example, Wilson permitted the diplomatic envoy for 
the provisional government of Kerensky, Boris Bakhmeteff, to retain 
his status as a diplomatic representative of “Loyal Russia.” Along 
with this recognition came access to millions of dollars in leftover 
loans that the United States had provided for the now-defunct 
provisional government. Bakhmeteff’s embassy would use these 
funds to support counter-revolutionary actions by purchasing and 
transferring supplies, such as rifles, for the White armies.20 While 
Wilson was initially hesitant to directly interfere in the quagmire that 
was the early Russian Civil War, he did not hesitate to provide 
financial support to the factions that appeared most likely to restore a 
democratic Russia. It would only take a just cause for Wilson to 
conclude that direct intervention could be used to help Russia. 
That just cause came in the form of a telegram received in June 
of 1918 from the American ambassador to China, Paul Reinsch. 
Reinsch was writing of several thousand Czechoslovakian prisoners 
of war that were attempting to reach the Siberian port city of 
Vladivostok. From Vladivostok they intended to find passage to 
France, where they could rejoin the war effort on the side of the 
Allies. The Soviets had given permission to these POWs to leave via 
Vladivostok, but Reinsch advised against permitting the pro-Ally 
troops to do so. He claimed that they could be invaluable to any 
future Allied operations in Siberia, especially in preventing the 
expansion of German influence.21 Wilson agreed with him, replying 
just a few days later, “There seems to me to emerge from this 
suggestion the shadow of a plan that might be worked, with Japanese 
and other assistance. These people are cousins of the Russians.”22  
  
                                                     
20 Foglesong, 58-60. 
21 Ambassador Paul S. Reinsch to Lansing, 13 June 1918, in Unterberger, 34. 
22 Wilson to Reinsch, 17 June 1918, in Unterberger, 35. 
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While Reinsch was thinking of the Czechoslovakian presence in 
terms of German influence, from Wilson’s mentioning of “Japanese 
and other assistance [emphasis added]” and the consideration of their 
Slavic ties to the Russians, it is clear that Wilson was considering their 
role in a larger intervention. 
While Wilson was formulating his plan for this new intervention, 
Lansing sent him a memo that now claimed that these troops were 
being attacked by Bolsheviks attempting to prevent them from 
reaching Vladivostok, and suggesting that support be sent to them 
immediately as a means of securing the Trans-Siberian Railway.23 In 
terms of Russian policy, this memo was one of the most important to 
reach President Wilson’s desk. The document provided Wilson with 
the diplomatic pretext he needed to intervene in Russia without 
appearing to infringe upon Russia’s right of self-determination. 
Intervention was now instead a rescue operation for these 
Czechoslovakian troops, something that the American people would 
support and could also diplomatically shield Wilson from claims that 
he was deviating from his Fourteen Points.24 Wilson could now 
commit troops to Russia without fearing the significant diplomatic 
and socialist backlash he expected would follow an unjustified 
intervention.  
Although the president had begun these tentative plans for 
Russian intervention as soon as he received the Peking memo, to 
suggest that Wilson made the decision to intervene in a vacuum 
would be a serious fallacy. As previously discussed, from January to 
April the Allies had pressed seriously for intervention, and when the 
Czechoslovakian situation arose, their efforts to secure American 
intervention re-doubled. Just a few weeks after receiving the Peking 
memo, both Japan and the Supreme War Council of the Allies sent 
requests reiterating hopes for American cooperation in intervention, 
and in the case of the Supreme War Council, detailing the reasons 
they believed intervention was necessary. These reasons included  
  
                                                     
23 Lansing on Czechoslovakian situation, 23 June 1918, in Unterberger, 35. 
24 Foglesong, 144. 
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“To assist the Russian nation to throw off their German 
oppressors… To shorten the war by the reconstitution of the 
Russian front… To deny to Germany the supplies of western Siberia 
and the important military stores at Vladivostok… To bring 
assistance to the Czecho-Slovak forces.”25 
In principle Wilson did not object to any of these goals, and now 
that he had a valid reason for intervention he was inclined to placate 
his allies by cooperating in operations within Russia.26 It is important 
to differentiate these motivating factors from deciding factors, 
however. Allied pressure upon Wilson encouraged him to enter 
Russia, but Allied pressure alone could not override his ideological 
concerns, the primary factor discouraging his involvement. Only the 
situation surrounding the Czechoslovakian legion, and the pretext of 
protection that it provided the United States government, allowed 
Wilson to agree to intervention. If he had agreed prior to having a 
just cause, he would have been knowingly violating his self-
determination principle, something the president was never willing to 
do, while also exposing himself to diplomatic and socialist backlash at 
home. Therefore, while Allied pressure played an important role in 
convincing Wilson to send troops to Russia, that pressure did not 
actually permit him to do so; the Czechoslovakian legion’s 
supposedly dire situation was what granted Wilson the diplomatic 
pretext he needed to finally agree to the requests of the Allies. 
Wilson’s response to the Czechoslovakian situation is not 
enough alone to condemn intervention upon their behalf as a pretext, 
and so other sources must be used to help clarify the situation. The 
American commander of the Siberian expedition, General Graves, 
also addresses the issue and provides important context. Graves 
notes that Czechoslovakian forces had control of the railroad in 
Siberia “two months before Japan and the United States decided to go to their 
relief [emphasis his],” and that their unofficial leader, Professor Tomas 
Masaryk, had ordered them not to retreat via Vladivostok weeks 
                                                     
25 Japan to Allied Governments on Siberia, 26 June 1918, and Supreme War Council’s to  
    President Wilson, 3 July 1918, in Unterberger, 35-38. 
26 Foglesong, 38. 
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before Wilson decided to send troops to Siberia, ostensibly to assist 
them in leaving.27 
It could be argued that intelligence during the time was unreliable 
and Wilson did not know of these facts, but when General Graves 
arrived in Siberia in September of 1918 and learned of the stability of 
the Czechoslovakian situation, he telegraphed Washington, saying, 
“Conditions are very satisfactory for Czechs in Siberia,” but he 
received no response or change of orders.28 General Graves also 
claims that American Consul General Poole sent a message to the 
Czechoslovakian legion in mid-June 1918 that congratulated them on 
their successes against the Bolsheviks and suggested that the United 
States would be in favor of their occupation of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway.29 It seems reasonable to extrapolate that the United States 
did not believe that the security of the Czechoslovakians in any way 
altered the purpose of the Siberian expedition, and potentially that 
the United States was fully aware that the Czechoslovakians were in 
no danger at all. This suggests that the true purpose of the expedition 
was never a rescue mission, and that the excuse of protecting the 
Czechoslovakians was always merely a diplomatic pretext for some 
other goal of Wilson’s. 
Although the steps toward intervention have now been clarified, 
Wilson’s hopes for what intervention in Russia could accomplish 
have yet to be addressed. The president’s goals for intervention were 
never directly stated, and it is therefore difficult to see what Wilson 
intended it to accomplish. Only by carefully analyzing the usage of 
American troops in Russia can the outline of his goals be discovered. 
One of the most important documents in regards to the usage of 
troops in Russia is the Aide Memoir, a document drafted by 
President Wilson which outlined the acceptable use of American 
forces in Russia. Despite having agreed to intervention, Wilson sets 
an extremely conservative tone in the Aide Memoir, saying, “the only 
legitimate object for which American or allied troops can be 
                                                     
27 William Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920 (New York: Jonathan Cape and  
    Harrison Smith, Inc., 1931), 340-341. 
28 Melton, 51. 
29 Graves, 70. 
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employed, [we] submit, is to guard military stores… and to render 
such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of 
their own self-defense.”30 Wilson had no control over the Allied 
forces, and so his hopes that they would be used in this manner were 
in vain. Nevertheless, it is clear that Wilson did not intend for 
American troops to use force to achieve any particular objective. If 
this is so, why would Wilson send troops to Russia in an effort to 
destroy Bolshevism if they were not permitted to take any action 
against the government? 
In practice, American troops in Siberia were sent to stabilize the 
region by assisting in operating the Trans-Siberian Railway and 
pacifying the people of Siberia, an expanded version of the same 
goals that Ambassador Reinsch advised Wilson the Czechoslovakians 
could accomplish.31 Wilson hoped these ostensibly benevolent goals, 
which he believed would not agitate the Bolshevik government in 
Moscow, would allow the Czechoslovakians to entrench themselves 
and gain local support. The Czechoslovakians’ nature as “cousins of 
the Russians” would allow them to gain the trust and respect of the 
Russian people, who could then “make Siberia safe for Russian 
democracy.”32 Wilson never intended to use American troops as 
combat forces to bring down Bolshevism. It was his policy to use 
American forces as stabilizers to allow other groups such as the 
Czechoslovakians or later White forces under Admiral Kolchak to 
become nuclei for further resistance movements. These movements 
could then be encouraged to march on Moscow and oust the 
Bolshevik government. In this way the president could intervene 
without being accused of violating his own principles of self-
determination, for ultimately it would be a Russian group that would 
oust the Bolsheviks and choose, ostensibly independent of any 
outside influence, their new form of government. 
  
                                                     
30 Graves, 8. 
31 Ambassador Reinsch to Wilson, 13 June 1918, in Unterberger, 34. 
32 In Unterberger, 35, and Foglesong, 164. 
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Wilson’s hopes for intervention did not match its reality. Almost 
immediately, the Allies attempted to expand the scope of their 
operations in Russia. First they suggested the Czechoslovakian legion 
move further west, which the United States protested as a hostile 
move toward the Bolshevik regime.33 After this, the French 
petitioned the United States to send commissioners to Siberia, which 
Secretary of State Lansing believed was an attempt to “impress our 
action in Siberia with the character of intervention rather than 
relief.”34 
When the United States proved unwilling to expand intervention 
diplomatically, the other Allies began to act of their own accord. 
General Graves regularly wrote of the divisions of the Allies in 
Siberia, often stating his belief that the Japanese funded the 
disruptive and brutal regimes of the Cossack chiefs Kalmikov and 
Semenov in the hopes of discrediting the White movement, in effect 
disrupting the work of all the other Allies.35 General Graves held a 
decidedly negative opinion of Allied operations in general, holding 
the personal belief that it was Japan’s goal to “occupy Eastern 
Siberia,” and that the Allies overtly attempted to destroy Bolshevism 
contrary to the spirit of Wilson’s agreement to intervene in Russia.36 
While Wilson wanted the Bolshevik government to be toppled, he 
believed that the Russian people should be the ones to do so, and 
that the only duty of the Allies in Russia was to make the nation 
stable enough for the Russians to accomplish this on their own. 
Wilson miscalculated in believing the Russian people would fight for 
a democracy, and the gross excesses and reactionary natures of 
Kalmikov and Semenov prevented any Russian democracy from ever 
forming in Siberia. 
In the northern Russian theater, the Allies deviated even further 
from Wilson’s plans, and events there seem to support Graves’s 
belief that the other Allies were not inclined to follow Wilson’s 
ideological approach to intervention. American troops in the 
                                                     
33 Lansing’s Memorandum of 20 August 1918, in Unterberger, 43. 
34 Lansing to Wilson, 22 August 1918, in Unterberger, 43. 
35 Melton, 55-58. 
36 Graves, 62, 194. 
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northern port of Archangelsk, which were under the command of 
British General Poole, were actively used in fighting the Soviet 
regime rather than merely guarding the supplies at Archangelsk as 
Wilson had ordered.37 Although Wilson had entered Russia with the 
hopes that no Allied soldier would need to raise a weapon to end the 
Bolshevik regime, this was not the same mentality that the other 
Allies held. Japan’s interests in Siberia were expansionist in nature, 
while the French and British still believed an eastern front could be 
reconstituted and were willing to topple the Bolshevik government 
by force to see it done. The Allies did not respect Wilson’s wishes for 
intervention in Russia, and thus his hopes were dashed. The 
Czechoslovakians and the regime of Admiral Kolchak both failed to 
unite Siberia into a force strong enough to fight the Bolsheviks, and 
the disastrous Archangelsk campaign failed to even recover the 
supplies they were sent to retrieve. War-weary and disillusioned, 
Admiral Kolchak’s government collapsed in December of 1919, and 
Secretary of State Lansing promptly suggested the withdrawal of 
American troops.38 America’s Siberian adventure had failed. 
Even in failure, President Wilson’s policies of intervention and 
democratization had long-lasting, and unintended, effects. A British 
attaché in Moscow in the fall of 1918, Robert Lockhart, held the view 
that the direct effect of the Archangelsk landing and General Poole’s 
subsequent decision to attack with such a small force “was to provide 
the Bolsheviks with a cheap victory, to give them new confidence, 
and to galvanize them.”39 Lockhart believed that the Allied policy of 
intervention assisted the Bolsheviks to consolidate their control over 
Russia, in effect reversing its goals. 
Even if Lockhart’s summation of the situation is exaggerated, the 
intervention in Russia had other profound effects, particularly 
diplomatically. The Bolsheviks saw intervention as capitalism’s 
inevitable attempt to crush socialism and viewed the powers that 
participated as hostile.40 This mistrust did not dissipate with time, and 
                                                     
37 Foglesong, 211-219. 
38 Lansing to Wilson, 23 December 1919, in Unterberger, 50. 
39 Robert Lockhart, as quoted in Foglesong, 221. 
40 Foglesong, 272. 
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indeed it can be viewed as a major factor in the relations of the cold 
war. Speaking in America in 1959, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev 
said, “armed intervention in Russia was the most unpleasant thing 
that ever occurred in the relations between our two countries.”41 
Clearly there was a continuity of mistrust between Russia and the 
West over this infringement upon her sovereignty, even though 
Wilson attempted to achieve it in the most diplomatic and peaceful 
way possible. 
Although Wilson succeeded in satisfying his allies by agreeing to 
intervene in Russia, he did not succeed in restoring democracy to the 
country, and indeed he can be viewed as accomplishing nothing more 
in Russia than setting the stage for the later and greater mistrust of 
the Cold War Era. 
– 
                                                     
41 Nikita Khrushchev, as quoted in Foglesong, 7. 
